

Sociology of Security: An Explanation of Electoral Violence Network in Ibadan, Nigeria

Dickson Ogbonnaya IGWE, Dip., B.Sc., M.Sc., M. Phil., PhD¹

Abstract

Using Conflict Theory as framework, exploratory design and qualitative approach, data was gathered from an ethnographic study carried out in Ibadan, South–Western Nigeria between October 2009 and March 2011. Using simple frequency distribution table and transcription, data was presented and content analysed discussing the social context of the relationship between the existence of rivalry and exclusion as security threats resulting in an uncertain political environment and the tendency to resort to electoral violence. It explores human security challenges from its political dimension looking at electoral violence as requiring Sociological interpretation. While growing tension exist between constitutionally well-defined electoral process and popular social practices that engender ‘we–they dichotomies’, ‘winner-take-all’ and ‘do-or-die mind-set’, this article argues have become turbulent component of Nigeria’s home grown democracy that have rubbed it of inclusiveness. Importantly, while conflicts of interest remain a social reality of any political environment, it argues that there are some local concerns that combine with social support networks to strengthen conflict of interests encouraging electoral violence. Drawing on the proliferation of political entrepreneur networks and their supporters often called “strongmen”, the study interrogates electoral violence as security risk, a criminal act that imposes criminals on the society, reinforces criminality, escalate victimisation and stagnate social development.

Key words: Security, Inclusiveness, Network, Electoral violence, Ibadan, Nigeria

Introduction

Human security has gained increasing attention as a framework for understanding the broader factors that contribute to peace and security. However, the political dimension of security remain regrettably understudied that made electoral process vulnerable to violence and destruction of lives

¹ Department of Criminology and Security Studies, Faculty of the Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria, igwedickson@gmail.com

and properties. Traditionally, the goal of security was the protection of state borders from external threats, but this study examines electoral violence that undermines political security that endangers free and fair election. This approach assumed that if the state political landscape is secure, the security of the population would automatically be assured (Gurr, 2000). Electoral violence is an aspect of political violence that undermines human and political security. Political insecurity in contrast involves violent imposition of leadership on the lead through violent capture of political power using a subverted electoral process usually called electoral violence. A Sociological excursion into security as explanation of electoral violence involves the interrogation of human/political security/insecurity. It involves the extent to which political actors and other stakeholders are involve or excluded in decision making system engendered through the electoral process. Therefore, electoral security from the foregoing perspective ensures that political recruitment and power transfer system of election is constitutionally defined not strongmen determined practices that reflect ‘we–they dichotomies’, ‘winner-take-all’ and ‘do-or-die’ mindset. Electoral security is categorised into physical, personal and information security.

Physical security involves the protection of tangible infrastructures and intangible facilities involved in electoral process. These include the electoral commission headquarters buildings and its district offices, registration and polling stations, political party offices, election observer offices, media organizations, election-related data and data storage device. Also, included are the residences of election officials or candidates as well as hotels known to be frequented by international visitors, media or observers and their election related data. Personal and information security on the other hand involve electoral stakeholders, including voters, public officials, election workers, security forces, candidates, party agents, election observers and media representatives and sensitive documents and data (Haider, 2008; UNDP. 2009).

In sum, electoral security can be defined as the process of protecting electoral process and stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and observers; electoral information such as vote results, registration data, and campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centers; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or disruption. Electoral security system target is to secure electoral process from conflict and violence that will ensure electoral justice and peaceful electoral management network to deliver a free and fair electoral outcome. Therefore, the study focus is

to examine Sociology of security: an explanation of electoral violence network in Ibadan, South-West Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

Conflict Theory

Positing that social groups have different interests in the society to protect, conflict theory argues that there is disparity in share of social arrangement that tend to favour some groups and disfavour others. Conflict that often escalates to violence ensues from this disparity quit often largely due inevitable emergence suspicion and domination. According to this theory, there is dominant and dominated class just as there is entrenched and vested interests (Igwe, 2011). Social conflict theory is a macro-theory that looks at how structural factors in society affect rates of electoral violence, human and political security. Conflict theory holds that there are higher numbers of abusers of electoral process found in lower social classes unlike in the higher social classes, disorganized neighborhoods, low-income families, and relatively politically powerless places. It postulate that the higher class mobilises the lower class for electoral violence because of their higher in-come position which is use to extract compliance and commitment to political loyalty of the lower class. Established asymmetric power relations translate to entrenched and vested interests. While the entrenched political interest of members of higher social class unlike the vested political interest, the point of conflict is the tendency to dominate, oppression and exclusion often suffered by members of lower social class with a political context (Peters, 1994; Gurr, 2000). The less powerful is made vulnerable to victimisation, discrimination; alienation in the hands of the powerful persons so much that according to this theory generates justification for electoral violence and violence to consolidation socio-political position. The theory opined that the powerful persons us coercion to demand and maintain order and compliance in society as the masses are not bound to society by their shared values (Rao, 2014). This perspective emphasizes social control based on domination and submission generated by social differentiation and class formation away from consensus and conformity. The classes so formed determine the place of interest in terms of its protection and dominance. The dominant interest is placed far above that of the dominated. Interest's pursuit among individuals and group is reality that draws conflict line fostering struggle and competition over control of societal resources (Williams, 1980; Seteolu, 2005).

In the context of Ibadan, personality politics using clientele structure dominate political landscape (Omobowale, 2006). Unequal power relations characterise clientele structure and make competition for power and its exercise between patron and client as well as among patrons inevitable. Extant literature on electoral violence in Ibadan underline the support networks of the armed groups and political forces manifesting in form of godfathers, godsons, traditional institutions and agencies action and inaction that plague explanation to the source of arms and access to armed groups (Adedibu, 1997; Wilkinson, 2004; Staniland, 2013). This position raises the issue of who the sponsor(s) of armed groups actually are. With this debate maintained by both the government and the public sponsors, elimination of the scourge continues to attract argument instead of solution. Such ethnopolitical conflict has implication on the intensity of electoral violence that feeds perceived injustice, marginalisation, and sense of threat to identity.

The Sociology of Security: any new direction?

Most sociologists unlike political scientists significantly ignore security as working concept preferring to focus more on power, authority, order and control. Nevertheless, security has become one of those taken for granted organising concepts which political scientists (especially international relations and strategic scholars) and their bureaucratic counterparts use without question (Gurr, 2000). It explains political, military and social activity. At the national and international levels, political and military leaders invoke ‘national security’ to legitimise the coercive agencies of the state (the military, the police, the judiciary, and secret intelligence organisations). Insurance companies particularly health insurer’s sell peace of mind as security value by insuring clients against probable and improbable risk. At the local level, private security firms deal on the protection of corporate, household and individual security through the provision of ‘security systems and services (burglar alarms, electronic surveillance, personal security guards, etc). Through informal (Neighbourhood watch groups) and formal (corporate guards) networks of vigilant citizens, community and industrial safety and security are regulated and maintained against variety of potential threats.

It is not in the interests of states, insurance companies, security firms or weapon seeking individuals to ask whether their actions deliver real 'security' or to adopt critical or relativist views of the meaning of security. Drawing on relativist thought, it is my opinion that both security and insecurity within its political sphere are functional at the same time dysfunction depending on the context of usage. While security of life (human security) guarantees political security and stability, insecurity on the other hand promote change that transforms politics and the electoral process for better outcome. To a significant level from sociological perspective, both security and insecurity are needful suggesting the absence of absolute security.

Security and Electoral Violence

The competition for political power, hostility and grievances associated with election generate violence not elections per se. Electoral violence is a calculated attempt to influence by force electoral process so as to control or predetermine electoral outcome (Walton, 2012a). Usually, the political opponents are the major target of electoral violence particularly when the stake of winning skewed to disfavour contestants who are not economically buoyant. At this point the contest assumes a supremacy struggle based on pecuniary solvency. Supremacy contest is strong drivers of violence as it throws up unequal grounds for participation before; during or after election. Fisher (2002) identified five types of supremacy conflict include: identity, campaign, balloting, result and representation conflict. Literature is replete on wide range measures of address electoral violence depending on the context.

Security sector reform: security sector especially aspect of election security demand engagement of professionals to exhibit required standards by drawing up and implementing clear rules of engagement for officers and other security personnel are critical to ensuring free and fair election and election-related security (UNDP, 2009; Walton, 2012a). This involves capacity building, ensuring the correct skills, training, resources.

Election monitoring: those involved in monitoring and verification missions as well as intelligence data gathering need training in other to nip on the bud likely electoral violence risks to ensure accurate and timely warning (UNDP, 2009). This preparedness serves as strategy that provides space for mitigation through mediation, problem solving negotiation.

Media monitoring: involve stakeholders ensuring that state and non-state actors embrace media production with sense of purpose that conform to acceptable standard of integrity.

Voter education: public awareness is the essence of deepening civic education.

Civil society and public engagement initiatives: consultation of stakeholder's forums at different social strata and nodes is an essential component of strategic leadership development and training process. These nodes provide platform for tracking and management of electoral violence.

Legal framework reforms: strengthened legal frameworks that provide for prompt arrest, prosecution and treatment of offender is necessary deterrent too criminal justice administration.

Electoral management bodies: management structure built on equity and inclusiveness reflected in professionalism balance and composition of the electoral management team is required to accelerate the process that legitimates electoral outcome. This strengthens mediation capacity.

Dispute resolution: whether formal or informal, promptness and neutrality provide impartial, efficient administration and dispossession of justice.

Social and economic support: focusing on the perpetrators leaving the victim in reducing electoral violence is not sustainable. Höglund & Jarstad (2010) suggest focus on both victim and perpetrators for a balance analysis, assessment and judgment.

Building trust, inclusiveness, local ownership and timing: trust, fairness, inclusiveness and time are key components of strategy to address electoral violence (UNDP, 2009).

Brief History of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Electoral violence is ubiquitous with differing impact on sociopolitical structure and development particularly in developing countries` politics. Before independence in October 1st 1960 from British colonial master, there were handfuls of colonial trained technocrats across Nigeria who spearheaded the journey to Nigerian independence. These patriots not only dared the dreaded colonial force to stir the water of nationalism, they also consistently insisted on dying for what they believed in and this Nigerian independence from colonialism. These selfless nationalists were not in politics by choice but as a platform common good for Nigeria and Africa at large (Reeves, 2006.). However, brazen manipulation of electoral process using violence scared patriots and technocrats out of politics. The dearth of professional technocrats seeking political office led to politicians who have no other job but embraced quest for power as a full-time money spinning

profession. Some of this category of politician got transformed into violence entrepreneurs because power is considered not earned but achieved and violence is a strong tool to achieve it. Each time these professional politicians are out of power they deploy violence to forcefully return back to power or remain unemployed.

In October 1st 1960, the dream of our heroes past came alive. Nigeria independence was peacefully born. Following the floors witnessed before, during and after the election that ushered in independence, regrettably, soon after, this hard earned freedom started sinking continuously into spiral of violence along identity and religious line. This escalated subsequently from national to regional elections, violence engulf the Western Region, christened “operation wet e”, between 1964 to 1965 was a fall-out of loss of confidence and trust that characterised previous federal and regional elections that left Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Akintola with irreconcilable differences. The same crises of confidence broke out in the northern region between supporters of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and supporters of other parties, mainly the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and Action Group. First republic crises culminated into two unfortunate events of military intervention and a bloody civil war in 1966 and 1967 respectively that have gone down in history as the root of Nigerian democratic nightmare.

Moreover, the second republic of 1979-1983 was not spared of horrific experiences of electoral violence that again attracted military intervention in politics up till 1999 military-civilian transition that seem to stabilize our democracy till date. According to Fafchamps, & Vicente 2013), the national elections conducted in 1983 were marred by massive post-election violence following the declared landslide victory of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in Oyo and Ondo states considered to be stronghold of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). Available statistics show that over 10,000 lives were lost to electoral violence between 1960 to June 2011 (Fafchamps & Vicente, 2013; Collier & Vicente, 2014). The statistic of intensity suggests a conclusion that the ancient city of Ibadan is a volatile flashpoint of electoral violence.

Intensity of electoral violence in Nigeria regularly gets the Nigerian Red Cross, involved in emergency relief operations. The resettlement of over 250,000 individuals and 32,000 families as a result of various acts of electoral violence in the country in 2001 alone (Elklit, (2007) is a case to reflect. It is against this background that it is concluded that behind Nigeria successful transition from military dictatorship to civilian democracy on the 29th of May 1999 were ugly and bitter intermittent experience of electoral violence. There was a paradigm shift from military coup to

civilian coup against democracy. Excess freedom provided by democracy had gone through a lot of abuse by political class openly engaging themselves most times in physical confrontation even on the floor of the parliament. An example of civilian politician rising against civilian regime occurred in Nigeria on 10th July, 2003 with Christ Ngige the then civilian governor of Anambra State was kidnapped to allow his replacement as governor. The coup was facilitated by the presence of members of the law enforcement who turn blind eyes to lawlessness. Exonerating themselves from complicity, the officers of the law in whose jurisdiction the offence was committed claimed they were acting on an “order from the above” (Sisk, 2008). This suggest local concern contribute to the security or insecurity of electoral process.

Table 1: Local concerns that encourage electoral violence.

	Are there local concerns that encourage electoral violence in Ibadan?	
Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	742	92.8
No	58	7.2
Total	800	100
	Give reasons for your answer	
Community wants people`s vote to count	172	21.5
Communities want votes translate to projects	104	13.0
Communities` opposition to political imposition	280	35.0
Activities of gangsters and political godfathers	244	31.5
Total	800	100
	What are these Local Concerns?	
Do-or-die politics	309	12.5
Politics of exclusion	100	31.6
Personality politics	252	38.6
Gangsterism	139	17.3
Total	800	100

Field Survey, 2009

Table 1 above shows that majority of the respondents (92.8 percent) agreed to the existence of local concerns. Regarding the local concerns, Table 1 shows that 38.6 percent were personality politics, 12.5 percent were do-or-die politics, 31.6 percent were politics of exclusion, and 17.3 percent were gangsterism. On the reason for the existence of these local concerns, Table 1 also shows that 35.0 percent mentioned community's opposition to political imposition, 31.5 percent identified activities of godfathers and gangsters, 21.0 percent stated that community wants people's vote to count and 13.0 percent indicate that community wants votes to translate to community project.

Literature confirms that the people of Ibadanland have centralized traditional administrative structures with monarch at the centre surrounded with lieutenants in decision making consisting of Obas, titled Chiefs and Baales (Tomori, 2004). This structure shows that aristocratic politics is not new to the people. It is characterised by the presence of strong men of political and economic power and influence that can easily become tyrants ones in power or even outside power through surrogates against democratic norm. Evidentially, data in table 1 affirms the presence of local concerns and mentioned them to include: (Politics of exclusion, Do-or-die politics, Personality politics, Gangsterism). The presence of these concerns suggests a strong root of aristocratic politics in Ibadan. For instance Chief Lamidi Adedibu built his political dynasty in Ibadan politics from that of Chief Obafemi Awolowo whom he served. Most present day political leaders in Nigeria emanate from such dynasty whose progenitors are called godfathers or school of thought example the Zikist, the Ballewas and so on. Godfathers device manipulate the system often to ensure electoral victory for themselves or their surrogates.

A party stalwart during an in-depth interview revealed that:

the discovery of seven data capturing machine belonging to the INEC in a party chieftain's house is a proof that he had been and can accommodate snatched ballot boxes in his house for electoral malpractices (Female, IDI/Party member/Iwo Road/20th December, 2009).

An IDI interviewee's position on the nature of electoral violence. Shows that:

Intimidation of opponents is the handiwork of those who are bent on getting to office at all cost. To them getting political power is a do or die matter. The critical

nature of electoral violence are ballot snatching, fighting electoral officials to have their way and disruption of peace at the polling booth by thugs under the control of politicians desperate for power (Male, IDI/ ex- political office holder/Oluyole Estate/ 9th December, 2009).

However, societies prone to electoral violence manifest traits of social disorganisation because of lack of consensus and control (Höglund, 2009) and vulnerable to other kinds of political violence because of deep-rooted social conflict surrounded by misplaced social values and lack of social control. There is violent repression of any resistance and this environment for fear that restrains even competent people from approaching politics even when it is obvious they have something good to offer the people. This is one way of shrinking political space. These manipulations combine with abuse of public media to constrain political participation. These indices are not synonymous to democratic principles. This weakness has also led to the personalization of politics and politics of imposition of candidate on the electorates. An IDI respondent at Iwo Road said:

The political concern of the people here is to guide against all forms of political imposition. This we do making sure that our votes count, they fight to ensure their mandate once given is not stolen. Yes, the people resort to violence only to protect their votes and mandate from hijackers (Female, IDI, Clergy, Iwo Road, 20/12/09).

Another interviewee at Agodi gate said thus:

Community's reaction against imposition of candidates on them by political patrons or incumbents generates electoral violence also in Ibadan. This is so because of the peoples' high literacy level that can be translated into increased political awareness. This is demonstrated in their concern for community development as reason for voting. The greatest concern now is how to contain local champions whose private interest obstructs community interest and development (Male, IDI, Clergy, Agodi gate, 08/12/2009).

However, the quest for power by political elites and politicians has implication for personality politics or politics of Godfatherism as we have it today, constituting very serious local concern. It

encourages electoral violence because highly placed personalities prefer to go violent or support violence to ensure the election of people who will serve their interest than to allow people who can be a threat to their social status and position in the society come to power (Human Right Watch (HRW) 2008). However, this concern has cultural antecedent in most Nigeria culture.

Secondly, politics becomes do or die because politicians who win exclude and silence all forms of opposition. This situation is not healthy for democracy that is supposed to be participatory. As observed in Table 1, the reason behind this unhealthy political development is the high value attached to political power as a means to attract money and physical community development of power holder`s community. The closer the members of any community are to political power the more attention their community receives from the federal government as politics involves lobbying (Iyayi, 2007) to guarantee ones interest. There is therefore, the need to be closer to power which becomes the priority of any community such that some make it do or die drawing battle lines.

Thirdly, in a monarch styled traditional setting like Ibadanland, politics revolve around certain personalities with chains of loyalists. This concern is practically expressed by the activities of godfathers and gangsters as Table 1 had shown. The long years of military rule in Nigeria also exacerbated personality politics as it produced more influential powerful personalities than the political space could accommodate. With militaristic mentality and little or no leadership training they just coerce the system to have their way politically even in retirement. This category of leaders in our various communities occupies critical and contentious position in Nigeria and as has been seen, in Ibadan. The emergence of this group brought to three the categories in contention for political power. They are- the traditional head of the community, the educated urban or rural elites (technocrats) and the retired or serving military or paramilitary officers. Battle lines are usually drawn along these categories before, during or after election for the search for political power. Fawole captured it thus:

“The vast majority of the Nigerian electorate do not really exercise the power of choice since they are often coerced, intimidated or blackmailed into merely confirming the candidates for office that had been pre-selected for them” (Fawole, 2005: 149).

Similarly, Sklar, *et al* (2006), asserts that military incursion into Nigerian militarised political space such that the political landscape is now dominated by retired military and law enforcement personnel that constitute power brokers and godfathers seating atop vast patronage network in a manner that political outcomes are primarily a function of the struggle among these privileged oligarchies (godfathers), civilian patrons, the powerless technocratic middle class and the civil society. Consequently, the real struggle is congealed into privileged few and less privileged majority interests. Asymmetric power relations social structure is created along interest line between entrenched interest and vested interest that generate most often, electoral violence (Kosongo, 2005). These local concerns that encourage electoral violence are however, not far from local values crashing with modern or foreign value each trying to displace the other. These antagonistic values usually of local politician versus urban politician, federal (Abuja) politicians versus state politicians and so on are strategic in instigating their supporters to violent action as a way of settling scores. In Ibadan and Basorun community in particular, the “Kotaorun squad” (local violent entrepreneurs who sell and make violence) is known to be the crack squad that advocates and champions community interest up to the election and beyond. Although several attempts cab be made to infiltrate this group by politicians (Omobowale, 2006) the vision is not lost instead network is formed without compromising its essence.

Table 2: Social networks of electoral violence in Ibadan.

	Are there Social Networks that sustain Electoral Violence in Ibadan?	
Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	733	91.6
No	67	8.4
Total	800	100
	State reasons for your answer above.	
Too many jobless youths seek employment	168	21.0
Increasing Intra-party crises of confidence	144	18.0
Increasing inter-party friction and intolerance	136	17.0
Increasing money politics and personality dominance in local politics.	192	24.0

Politics of continuity rubbed of ideology	160	20.0
Total	800	100
What are these Social Networks?		
Special Godfathers` Network	216	27.2
Party Youth Wing	57	7.1
Party Violent Squad	174	21.8
Jobless Miscreants	239	29.9
All of the Above	114	10
Total	800	100

Field Survey, 2010

Table 2 above shows that majority of the respondents (91.6 percent) affirmed that the existence of social network sustain electoral violence. On the same table 2, on what constitute social network of electoral violence, 27.2 percent of the respondents indicated special godfathers` network, 29.9 percent mentioned jobless miscreant network, 21.8 percent accepted party violent squad network, 7.1 percent identified party youth wing network. On the issue of possible reasons for these social network, 24.0 percent of respondents indicated Increasing money politics and personality dominance in local politics, 21.0 percent show it was due to too many jobless youths seeking employment, 20.0 percent agreed it was due to politics of continuity without ideology, 18.0 percent stated that it was due to Increasing Intra-party crises of confidence and 17.0 percent agreed it was due to increasing inter-party friction and intolerance.

The above findings in Table 2 show that special godfathers` networks exist in Ibadan. Social networking in politics is a special strategy in political science used to foster political alliance and re-alliance among political stakeholders (Ayoade, 2008). This strategy is usually used to separate and consolidate ideological bents. The existence of godfather`s network is buttressed by Albert, (2005) position that power holders cannot be determined by mere electoral votes but through networking with the few elite in the corridors of power whose decisions cannot be neglected by power holders. Some of these personalities hold power while some do not but wield tremendous influence on power holders because they are power brokers. Creating party youth wing, they take advantage of large supply of jobless and frustrated youth by recruiting them with money to go and fight political opponents (Omitola, 2003). Many of the recruited youths are even promised

employment or political appointments as incentive. There is also power play in favour of the minority class of the privileged in party politics such that their interest becomes dominant and unquestionable. For instance, in many political parties, the decision making process, resources allocations, and the nomination of candidates for political appointments are often defined not by party constitution but by party strongmen (Ayoade, 2008) called them party leaders.

An FGD discussant affirmatively states:

....these party leaders have boys that fight for vote and election are well organized and equipped with weapons. They have leaders leading them; their actions are ordered by their leaders and they hit targets (Male, FGD, Iwo Road, 21th, December 2009).

Consequent to the above positions is a conclusion that electoral violence is not spontaneous instead it is planned and structured by patrons or godfathers networking within and outside their parties of origin just to ensure their political ambition are not compromised.

Another FGD discussant states:

...party agents and party youth supporters of the various parties contesting election are the trouble makers I know. Because they want their person to win, they attack people first especially election officials and other party agent and this result to fight that scare people away from voting is at this point that they carry the ballot box and run away (Female, FGD, Agodi gate, 17th, December 2009).

Party Violent Squad are hired thugs of the party that are mobilized, paid periodically and used to obstruct opponent`s campaign and bill boards, fliers and for humiliation so as to create fear in them enough to scare them out of contention (Omitola, 2003). This group is also highly organized and profit oriented. Their service is cash and carry.

An IDI interviewee states:

Party violent squad is usually under contract arrangement not members of the party. They use the cover of night some time to track down their target

some times in broad day light. They strike and disappear. They are hardly arrested even if they are arrested hardly can the criminal justice system process their case for fear of order from above they are Jobless Miscreants (Male, IDI, Ring Road, 21st, December 2009).

Each of these power elites groups (godfathers) has supporters loyal to them that they network with beyond the political parties they belong to. This violent squad according to data is peculiar to not only the political parties but also to strong individual who can pay the bill. These personalities use members of the squad as guard and special assistance or as their public relations officer. The party patrons or godfathers seek to network with the youth wing and the violent squad through undue incentives and rewards to ensure maximum cooperation and support (Olurode, 1999). Those godfathers who do not enjoy much their party groups resort to network with groups outside the party such as National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) from where they gather motor part boys and miscreants on the street most of whom are jobless for coverage against political intimidation and humiliation within and outside the party.

The operations of these groups and their leaders constitute threat to peaceful electoral process. This has compelled some communities to raise and maintain groups to ward off threats especially to ensure that the people`s vote count and translate to winning seat in government by people`s preferred candidates. For the above reasons the operations of groups like “Kotorun group” known with the political ideology of fire for fire become needful for the community drive against political imposition from godfathers. Lewis, (2003), captured the nature of party politics in Nigeria thus:

“The nebulous party system has little to do with any distinct ideologies, strategies, or sectional appeals. The major parties are relatively diverse in their leadership and constituencies, but remain focused on elite contention and patronage. Ethnicity is still a crucial vehicle for political mobilization. Personalities and clientelist networks predominate; internal discipline is weak; internecine battle is common. Politics is ‘winner-takes-all’ because public office is still a high road to personal enrichment by dubious means” (Lewis, 2003; 131).

An IDI conducted at Ring road and Agodi-gate community reveals thus:

Most street and garage boys some of whom are stark illiterates and jobless are mobilized through networking by party chieftains (godfathers) to carry out the later instruction to intimidate opponents most times using cutlass, machetes, dane guns to scare away people and create uneasy situation to facilitate manipulation of electoral process. Once these boys are paid and mobilized by their sponsors, they are quartered to be ready at any time the need for their operation arises (Male, IDI, Community leaders, Ring road and Agodi-gate, 14th December, 2009).

This finding may have a bearing on the role of social networking on government activities to the people. This contribution brings us back to the issue of overbearing roles of some opinion leaders who had, according to Olutayo and Abisoye (2009) and Omobowale (2006) assumed the status of political oligarchy. They serve as political brokers or middlemen. They, in the spirit of networking, serve as link between the teeming electorates and their ‘favoured’ or ‘anointed’ candidates. The candidate in a bid to secure the people’s mandate pledge his loyalty to the oligarchy and the electorates in order to have access to government largesse (patronage) also look up to the tiny but highly powerful oligarchy who constitute the political patrons.

The culture of winner takes all has left assuming political office most desirable to many politicians especially those without other skill to fall back to at the expiration of their tenure in office. These professional politicians are the ones that approach politics with do-or-die mindset because the cost of losing election is the lose livelihood. They fly various identity cards as incentive label such as family, clan, faction, state language, tribe, etc. These identity affinities are often abandoned immediately power gets to them it is then personalise, priority is shifted from us to mine and ultimately to self aggrandisement. That votes translate to political seats and power place voters and their votes on a high utility value that all political stakeholders especially the godfathers go all out to get. As a strategy, party machinery and inter-part alliance form networks that produce loyalists. This standby loyalist also called party praise singers or party agents are sustained through party subvention to ensure their availability during election for use as thugs. Some unemployed youth are usually part of these reserved loyalists. Abubaka, (2005) puts it this way:

“An essential element in promoting free and fair elections in the country is the free and fair conduct of party nominations. Most elections are ‘rigged’ before they occur because candidates are eliminated through various methods. These include subverting party constitution and rules, the use of thugs, corrupting party officials to disqualify, or annul the nomination of some candidates and other illegal methods of distorting the wishes of the electorate” (Abubakar 2005; 10).

This is why the stake of youths generally either as unemployed, party youth or as youth mobilizer for social actions like solidarity rally or campaign coordinator, is considered very high by the power elite that aspire to political power. It is on this ground that election-related violence often counts as instrument that perpetuate patronage politics. Thus, the stakes of elections are often seen as opportunities to engage in corruption and economic rent-seeking. This in turn leads to what (Robinson, 1996) called polyarchy. Polyarchy is basically defined as:

“Nothing more than the holding of elections. Equality of conditions for electoral participation is not relevant, and these conditions are decided unequal under capitalism owing to the unequal distribution of material and cultural resources among classes and groups, and the use of economic power to determine political outcomes. Political rights are most importantly the judicial right, not the material ability to become a candidate and participate in elections. The outcome is unimportant” (Robinson, 1996:636).

Damm (2003) noted that in developing countries including Nigeria, both the local and national levels; before, during and after elections, violence occurs in the form of direct intimidation of voters through violence directed at specific individuals as a revenge mission, and at the national level, violence additionally occurs in the form of perpetrators attempting to control social institutions that influence voter opinions, such as the media or civil society. Democracy unlike polyarchy is hard to deepen when there is tension and high uncertainty characterise electoral process (Dahl, 1971). For instance, that is when margins of victory are quite close; there is a greater likelihood that allegations of fraud will lead to frustration and potentially to violent clashes.

Table 3: The Impact of Electoral Violence on Democracy.

	Does Electoral Violence Impact Democracy negatively?	
Responses	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	787	98.3
No	13	1.7
Total	800	100
	Give reasons for your answer above	
Good Governance is stalled	147	18.4
The preferred Candidates are not Elected	220	27.5
Voting without choice	135	16.9
The Electorate`s right to vote is denied	241	30.1
All of the Above	57	7.1
Total	800	100
	How does Electoral Violence Negatively impact Democracy?	
Elections are between voice and violence	160	20.0
Low political participation and competition.	216	27.0
Electoral victory suffer legitimacy crises	128	16.0
Public policy thrust is usually prescriptive	136	17.0
Democratic institutions are weak and biased	160	20.0
Total	800	100

Field Survey, 2010

Table 3 above shows majority of respondents (98.3 percent) concurred that electoral violence impact democratization negatively. Table 3 also shows that (30.1 percent) of the respondents agreed that the electorates` rights to vote is denied and that attests to the fact that electoral violence impacts democracy negatively. Also, confirming the impact of electoral violence on democracy is (27.5 percent) who observed that preferred candidates are not elected. Furthermore, table 3 again

shows that (20 percent) of the respondents observe that electoral process has been reduced to voice and violence that has weakened democratic institutions. Majority of the respondents sighted low political participation and competition. However, (17 percent) indicated that voting without choice is an evidence of their claim that electoral violence negatively impact democratization. Whereas (16 percent) of the respondents said electoral victory suffer legitimation crises. These responses indicate how electoral violence negatively impact democracy.

According to Snyder and Mansfield, (2001) the expansion of space for political participation in democratization processes, especially where state institutions are weak, give opportunities for elites to appeal to exclusionary nationalism and the concomitant identification of internal or external enemies in order to gain or retain power. Consequently, upon this view, partially consolidated democracies are prone to both international and internal war. Further, the Nigerian State, a colonial heritage can be characterized as rent-seeking, dictatorial and anti-development (Agbaje, & Adejumobi, 2006) because it is based on personality interest of godfathers. The assumption is further corroborated by qualitative data collected thus:

Some ex-political power holders are weak to resist the urge to foist themselves on the people as rulers. This strong urge make people act as though they are the law. Some members of this group have military background. The military has the culture of violence as part of training. Once in power or outside political power these dictators use thugs/jobless miscreants or the unemployed to surround themselves as their godfathers (Baba Agba). Their economic buoyancy enable them pay the unemployed heavily to engage them in electoral violence to ensure electoral victory. (IDI/Clergy/Ring Road/31st November, 2009).

The above standard contradicts the democratic definition as posited by Dahl (1998:11) thus:

A system of elected representative government operated under the rule of law, where the most significant parts in the population participate in effective representation in the practice of making government decisions, that is, allocation of scarce resources (Dahl, 1998:11).

Cohen, in other words puts it thus:

“Democracy is a system of community government in which by and large the members of the community participate or may participate directly in the making of decisions which affect them all” (Collier and Levitsky 1997:7).

From the above perspectives, there is an assumption of equal and direct participation as the core ingredient of democracy. Herein lays the role of the masses in democratic participation. This role is fundamental to the survival of democracy as according to (Lindberg, 2003) democratic institutions should be deepened such that will enjoy people`s confidence to be capable of providing a free and fair opportunity of voting, accepting or rejecting the leaders who will lead them.

Summary

The study has examined sociology of security: an explanation to electoral violence in Ibadan, South-west Nigeria using conflict theory as framework and data from exploratory designed qualitative approach to establish that social security is defective when its component parts do not reflect inclusiveness. It further revealed that electoral process in Ibadan is wobbling and slipping into violent conflict because it is not inclusive. The study uncovered the preponderance of personality conflict among strongmen called godfathers amongst themselves and sometimes with their godsons as a major local concern that combine with impunity against the rule of law to cripple free and fair election. It is usual for electorates resort to self-help to get justice done both at the polling booth and at the electoral administrative level using all sorts of support networks of influential political leaders who there are committed to.

Conclusion

Any electoral arrangement that succumb to selection or nomination instead of free and fair election is not secured, inclusive and does not deepen competitive, representative, participatory and rule of law in decision making as hallmarks of liberal democracy anywhere in the world.

References

- Abubakar, A, 2005. 'Elections and the Peoples Mandate', Keynote Address delivered at the National Conference on 'Elections, 2007: Protecting the Peoples' Mandate' organized by the International Human Rights Law Group, on 25 August 2005.
- Adedibu, L. A. A. 1997. What I saw on the Politics and governance of Ibadan land and the Issue of June 12 1993: H.U.A. Nigeria Ltd.
- Agbaje, A. & Adejumo, S. (2006). Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria: *Africa Development*, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, p. 61.
- Alemika, E.E.O. (2004a). "Elections as Organized Crime: Nigerian Experience". Paper Presented at the Centre for African Studies Seminar, University of Cape Town, May 12.
- Albert, I. O. 2005. Explaining godfatherism in Nigerian Politics; *African Sociological Review* Vol. 9, No. 2, p: 79-105.
- Arnold Wolfers 1962. *Discord and Collaboration*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Ayoade, J. A. A. 2008. Godfather Politics in Nigeria in Adetula, V.O. *Money and Politics in Nigeria; International Foundation for Electoral System IFES-Nigeria*; Petra Digital Press, Abuja-Nigeria.
- Barry Buzan 1983. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton: The Harvester Press and University of North Carolina Press, Chapters 1-4, 8-9.
- Collier, P., & Vicente, P. C. 2014. Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria. *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 124, No. 574, p: 327-355.
- Collier, D., & Levitsky, S. 1997. Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in Comparative research. *World Politics*, Vol. 49, No.3, p. 845-855.
- Damm, D. 2003. "Managing Election Violence in Nigeria: New Strategies for the International Donor Community." Draft Report for the International Donor Community Nigerian Steering Committee, 1st, December 2003, Abuja, Nigeria.
- Dahl, R. 1998. *On Democracy* (New Haven, CT.), p: 36-37.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Elklit, J. 2007. Democracy and Elections in Africa in Challenges of Conflict, Democracy and Development in Africa edited by K Matlosa, J Elklit and B Chiroro. EISA 2007.
- Fafchamps, M., & Vicente, P. C. 2013. Political violence and social networks: Experimental evidence from a Nigerian election. *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 10, No. 10, p: 27-48.
- Fawole, W. A. 2005. Voting without choosing interrogating the crisis of electoral Democracy in Nigeria in Lumumba-Kasongo, T., Liberal Democracy and its Crisis Africa; CODESRIA, Zed Books; UNISA Press Pretoria.
- Fischer, J. 2002. *Electoral Conflict and Violence*. IFES White Paper, 1. <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan019255.pdf>
- Gurr, Ted Robert. (2000) People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Haider, H. 2008. *Election-related conflict*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 548. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Höglund, K. 2009. Electoral violence in conflict-ridden societies: concepts, causes, and consequences. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 3, p: 412-427.
- Höglund, K. & Jarstad, A. 2010. *Strategies to Prevent and Manage Electoral Violence: Considerations for Policy*. Policy and Practice Brief 1. ACCORD.
- Human Right Watch (HRW) 2008. Nigeria: Elections threatened by Violence and abuse of Power: New ork: (www.hrw.org) Accessed on 26/1/2009.
- Igwe, D. O. 2011. The continuity of 'autocratic presidency' in Africa's democratisation project, *International Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 7, Nos. 1, p: 2/3
- Iyayi, F. 2007. 'Elections and Electoral Practices in Nigeria: Dynamics and Implications', *The Constitution: Journal of Constitutional Development*, Vol. 5, No. 2, June.
- Kosongo, L. T. 2005. The problematic of liberal democracy and democratic process. In *Liberal Democracy and its Critics in Africa*. CODESRIA in Association with zed book, London.
- Lewis, P., 2003. 'Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 3, July, p: 131-144.
- Lindberg, S. 2003. The democratic qualities of competitive elections participation in Africa; *Commonwealth & Comparative Politic*, Vol. 41, No. 61, p: 62.

- Olurode, O. 1999. The Tactics and Strategies of Combating Violence and Brigandage on Our Campuses, in Ogunye, T. et al, (eds), *Citadels of Violence*, Committee for The Defense of Human Rights (CDHR), Lagos, pp.2-13.
- Olutayo, L. and Abioye, T. 2009. Political Participation and Accountability: An Appraisal of some salient Democratic Tenets in Oyo State Nigeria in Ogundiya, S. I., Olutayo, O. A. and Amzat, J.(Ed.), *A Decade of Re-Democratization in Nigeria 1999-2009.*, Ayayayuyu Bureau of Commercials, Ibadan.
- Omitola, B.O. 2003. Intra and Inter-party Crises in Nigerian Politics: Implications for the Sustainability of the Fourth Republic in *International Review of Politics and Administration*; Vol.1, No.1, p: 146-150.
- Omobowale, A. O. 2006. Political Clientelism and Rural Development in Selected Communities in Ibadan, Nigeria; Ph.D Thesis Submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan.
- Peters, R., 1994. The new Warrior Class, *Parameters* Vol. 24; No. 2, p: 24-32.
- Rao, S. 2014. *Dealing with election-related violence in fragile and conflict-affected states*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1126. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Reeves, P. 2006. *Impact Assessment: Election Assistance to Palestinian Civil Society Organisations*. Report prepared for United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Robinson, W. 1996. Globalization, the World System, and “Democracy Promotion” in US Foreign Policy. *Theory and Society*, Vol. 25, No.5, Oct., p. 615-665.
- Seteolu, D. 2005. ‘Historical trajectories of elections in Nigeria: the state, political elite and electoral politics’ in G. Onu & Momoh, A. (eds) *Elections and democratic consolidation in Nigeria*, Vol. 35, No.36, p: 68.
- Sisk, T. 2008. *Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence*. Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Meeting San Francisco, California, March 24-28, 2008.
- Sklar, R. L. et al, 2006. Nigerian completing Obasanjo`s Legacy: *Journal of Democracy*: Vol. 17, No. 3, July.

- Snyder, J & Mansfield, E.D., 2001 Democratic Transitions and War: From Napoleon to the Millennium's End. In *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, edited by C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. A. All. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Staniland, P. 2013. *Armed Groups and Militarized Elections*.
<http://home.uchicago.edu/~paul/StanilandMilElecDec13.pdf>. Accessed on 14/12/2018.
- Tamori, M.A. 2004. Ibadan Omo Ajoro Sun: A New Perspective of Ibadan History.
- UNDP. 2009. *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming*. Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- USAID. 2013. *Best Practices in Electoral Security: A Guide for Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Programming*. USAID.
- Walton, O. 2012a. *Impact of Professional Election Security*. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 791. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Wilkinson, S. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, G. 1980. State and Society in Nigeria (Ibadan: Afrografika), p: 68, 72.